UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
February 7, 2012
J. STOCKBRIDGE, ET AL., (DOC. 88)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Michael Contreraz, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 14, 2006. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff's amended complaint, filed on February 3, 2009, against Defendants Stockbridge-Cota,*fn1 Rodriguez, Franco, Davis, and Carlos for violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
On November 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to file a supplemental complaint, along with the proposed supplement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Defendants filed an opposition on December 15, 2011, and Plaintiff filed a reply on January 17, 2012.
This action is currently proceeding on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim arising out of an incident on June 28, 2004, at
California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State
Prison-Corcoran. Plaintiff seeks to add new claims against current
defendant Stockbridge-Cota and proposed new defendants Cota and
Gonzalez. The claims Plaintiff seeks to add arise from
events between approximately June 24, 2010, and June 2011.*fn2
Plaintiff alleges that StockbridgeCota, Cota, who is
Stockbridge-Cota's spouse, and Gonzalez attempted to pressure him to
drop this lawsuit and when he refused to capitulate, they orchestrated
the delay of his prison transfer, which caused his continued retention
in administrative segregation. (Doc. 89, ¶¶41-55.)
Pursuant to Rule 15(d), "the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Rule 15(d) does not require the moving party to satisfy a transactional test, but there must still be a relationship between the claim in the original pleading and the claims sought to be added. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 474 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, "[w]hile leave to permit supplemental pleading is favored, it cannot be used to introduce a separate, distinct and new cause of action." Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although Plaintiff attempts to support his request for leave to supplement by arguing that the events in 2010 and 2011 are a continuation and extension of the events in 2004, his argument lacks merit. The events are related only in that Stockbridge-Cota, Cota, and Gonzalez's actions in 2010 and 2011 were allegedly motivated by their desire to get Plaintiff to drop the present excessive force lawsuit. To the extent they give rise to new claims for violation of Plaintiff's federal rights, however, the events complained of in 2010 and 2011 are separate, distinct, and new causes of action.
This action has been pending for more than five years and the incident giving rise to Plaintiff's claim occurred almost eight years ago. Allowing Plaintiff to add these separate, distinct, and new claims at this juncture would not serve the interests of judicial economy and convenience, and the proposed claims are simply not sufficiently related to the present claim to support allowing leave to supplement. Planned Parenthood, 130 F.3d at 402; Keith, 858 F.2d at 474. ///
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion seeking leave to file a supplemental complaint, filed on November 30, 2011, is HEREBY DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.