UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PRIORITY SEND CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
February 17, 2012
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
MARIA G. ORGETA, ET AL.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable John F. Walter, United States District Judge
CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL JS-6
S. Eagle Courtroom Deputy
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: None ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS: None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO RIVERSIDE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
On August 12, 2011, Plaintiff U.S. Bank, National Association, as Trustee for CitiGroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-AMC2 ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Defendants Maria G. Ortega and Pedro Garcia (Defendants) in Riverside County Superior Court. On February 7, 2012, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal, alleging that this Court has
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School , 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). "Because of the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, the statute is strictly construed, and federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Duncan v. , 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted). There is a strong presumption that the Court is without jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears. See Fifty Associates v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1990). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that removal is proper. See, e.g., Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); Emrich v. Touche , 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988).
Defendants fail to meet their burden of demonstrating that removal is proper. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges one claim for unlawful detainer under state law. While Defendants allege in their Notice of Removal that the claim arises under federal law, "[a]n unlawful detainer action does not raise a question arising under federal law and so, once removed, must be remanded for lack of jurisdiction." Cooper v. Washington Mut. Bank, 2003 WL 1563999, *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2003) (internal citation omitted).
Defendants also allege in their Notice of Removal that diversity jurisdiction exists. Diversity jurisdiction founded under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires that (1) all plaintiffs be of different citizenship than all defendants, and (2) the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. In their Notice of Removal, Defendants fail to allege the citizenship of either themselves or Plaintiff. See, e.g., Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that "the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, speaks of citizenship, not of residency"); Bradford v. Mitchell Bros.
, 217 F.Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (holding that a petition alleging diversity of citizenship upon "information and belief" is insufficient to confer jurisdiction). Because neither the "four corners" of the Complaint nor the Notice of Removal contain sufficient allegations concerning the citizenship of the parties, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing that diversity jurisdiction exists. See Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir.
In addition, Defendants allege that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), which provides:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all person within the jurisdiction thereof[.]
However, to remove a case under Section 1443(1), a defendant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court in George v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 794-804 (1966) and City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824-28 (1966):
First, the petitioners must assert, as a defense to the prosecution, rights that are given to them by explicit statutory enactment protecting equal racial civil rights. Second, petitioners must assert that the state courts will not enforce that right, and that allegation must be supported by reference to a state statute or a constitutional provision that purports to command the state courts to ignore the federal rights.
California v. Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635, 636 (9th Cir. 1970) (internal citations omitted). Defendants fail to satisfy either prong. Moreover, even if Defendants could satisfy the first prong, they fail to identify any formal expression of state law that prohibits them from enforcing their civil rights in Riverside County Superior Court, and they fail to present any evidence that suggests that the Riverside County Superior Court would not enforce their civil rights in its proceedings. Patel v. Del 446 F.3d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, this action is REMANDED to Riverside County Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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