The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Larry Alan Burns United States District Judge
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mark Lemoge claims he was injured when a concrete table collapsed on
his leg at Camp Pendleton, a Marine Corps base in San Diego County. He
filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
specifically, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and §2671--2680.*fn1
He alleges the United States was negligent by failing to
properly maintain, supervise, and construct the table. Roxina Lemoge,
his wife, asserts related claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and loss of consortium. Now before the Court is the
Government's motion for summary judgment.
Mr. Lemoge is an employee of Prosoft, a company hired by the military to provide services at Camp Pendleton. On April 17, 2004, Lemoge and his supervisor, Arnold Chavez, went to Camp Pendleton to set up for a company party. Mr. Chavez had reserved a cabana inside Camp Pendleton at Lake O'Neill, which is surrounded by camping grounds, picnic tables, barbecue pits, and bathroom facilities. While setting up for the party, Mr. Lemoge leaned onto a concrete table and it collapsed, injuring his leg. Following the accident, Lemoge discovered that there were no supporting brackets installed in the table, as required by the instructions, and further, that there were pre-drilled holes in the table where the brackets should have been attached. Lemoge claims that his injuries are substantial and is seeking $1,000,000 in compensation. His wife was not present when this incident occurred.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As the moving party, it is the Government's burden to show there is no factual issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet this burden, the Government must show that the Lemoges lack evidence to support their claims. Id. at 325. If it makes that showing, the Lemoges must set forth "specific facts" to show there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
The Court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Lemoges. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Rather, the Court determines whether the record "presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251--52. Not all alleged factual disputes will serve to forestall summary judgment; they must be both material and genuine. Id. at 247--49. "If conflicting inferences may be drawn from the facts, the case must go to the jury." LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Claims against the United States under the FTCA are governed by the law of the state where the incident occurred. O'Neal v. United States, 814 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir.1987). In this case, that law is California Civil Code § 846, a recreational use statute. The Government argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because § 846 immunizes landowners from liability when their land is used for recreational purposes. As a general rule, this is true, but it's not the end of the analysis. The owner of land used for recreational purposes can still be liable 1) for a willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity, 2) for injuries suffered where permission to enter for recreational purposes was granted for consideration, or 3) where any person is expressly invited rather than merely permitted to come upon the premises by the landowner.
The Court must therefore determine if any of these exceptions might apply in this case. If so, the case can proceed to trial. If not, the Government is entitled to summary judgment.
A. Willful or Malicious Failure to Warn
A landowner's failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition is willful or malicious when there is "(1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril to be apprehended, (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is a probable, as opposed to a possible, result of the danger, and (3) conscious failure to act to avoid the peril." Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 53 Cal. App. 4th 854, 859 (1997).
The Government maintains it had no knowledge of the danger posed by the table, and argues that, without knowledge, it could not have consciously failed to prevent the harm. It supports its argument with the daily incident records at Lake O'Neill that show only one previous incident with a table in the area. That incident took place years earlier when a car ran into one of the tables causing it to collapse.
Plaintiff argues the Government knew the table was dangerous because supporting brackets were not installed in it. However, the mere fact that brackets were not installed does not mean the Government was aware that they were missing in the first place, nor that the Government knew of a potential danger. Similarly, this evidence fails to show knowledge of probable injury. Without knowledge of a potential ...