The opinion of the court was delivered by: Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge United States District Court
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO FEDERAL CLAIMS AND DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger with Wells Fargo Bank, Southwest, N.A., f/k/a Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, f/k/a World Savings Bank, FSB ("Wells Fargo") and Golden West Savings Association Service Co. ("Golden West") have filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike. Plaintiff Luz E. Gomez has moved for a preliminary injunction that would enjoin Defendants from selling her home at a trustee's sale. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the federal claims, and Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. The Court defers ruling on the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state claims and the motion to strike.
On August 27, 2004, Plaintiff and her husband borrowed $339,375.00 from World Savings Bank, FSB. (Request for Judicial Notice in support of Motion to Dismiss (RJN), Ex. A.) The loan was secured by a Deed of Trust on property located at 132 E. Street, Chula Vista, CA 91910 (the "Property"). (RJN, Ex. B.) The Deed of Trust identifies the "Lender" as "World Savings Bank, FSB, its successors and/or assignees." (Id.) The Deed of Trust identifies the Trustee as "Golden West Savings Association Service Co." (Id.)
On December 31, 2007, World Savings Bank, FSB changed its name to "Wachovia Mortgage, FSB." (RJN, Ex. G.). Effective November 1, 2009, Wachovia Mortgage, FSB changed its name to "Wells Fargo Bank Southwest, N.A.," and merged into Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (RJN, Ex. I.)
On December 7, 2009, a Notice of Default was recorded. (RJN, Ex. C.) The Notice of Default was issued by Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation, as "either the original trustee, the duly appointed substituted trustee, or acting as agent for the trustee or beneficiary under a deed of trust." The notice informed Plaintiff and her husband that they were in default in the amount of $8,556.22, and explained that payments should be made to "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., also known as Wachovia Mortgage, a division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and formerly known as Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, formerly known as World Savings Bank, FSB."
In a Substitution of Trustee, recorded on April 1, 2011, Wells Fargo (by Cal-Western as Attorney in Fact) substituted Cal-Western as the trustee. (RJN, Ex. D.) The form was notarized on August 18, 2010, but indicates that the "effective date" is December 3, 2009.
On April 14, 2011, a Notice of Trustee's Sale was recorded. (RJN Ex. E.) The notice, which was signed by Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation, set the sale for May 5, 2011.
On August 17, 2011, Plaintiff commenced this action in state court. Defendants removed the case to federal court, alleging federal question jurisdiction.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to credit mortgage payments that Plaintiff made and initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings even though Plaintiff was not in default. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants lacked standing to initiate non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.*fn1 Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) negligence; (2) fraud; (3) intentional misrepresentation; (4) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1572; (5) false light; (6) breach of contract; (7) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (8) unjust enrichment; (9) violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (10) quiet title; (11) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et. seq.; (12) violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq.
In an order filed on October 31, 2011 ("TRO Order"), the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and lis pendens. The Court scheduled the motion for preliminary injunction to be heard simultaneously with Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to strike.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should be granted only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the allegations of material fact in plaintiff's complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). "A plaintiff's obligation to prove the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not ...