The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
FIRST SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 1983 (Doc. 1) THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
I. Screening Requirement and Standard
Plaintiff Bernard C. Hughes, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 10, 2011. The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now higher, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), and to survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Deuel Vocational Institution in Tracy, California, brings this suit against Sheriff Brian Muller, Undersheriff Douglas Binnewies, Lieutenant Susan Brent, and Captain Joel Bibby for violating his rights under the United States Constitution while he was a pretrial detainee at the Mariposa County Jail.
Plaintiff alleges that for fifteen years, the Mariposa County Sheriff's Department has had the ability to monitor and record conversations. During the course of Plaintiff's criminal trial, information obtained from Plaintiff's private conversations with his attorney and psychiatrist were leaked. Plaintiff was unsure how the information was obtained until he later learned of the Sheriff Department's ability to monitor and record conversations.
Plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance and his request that the monitoring of legal visits be discontinued was denied by Defendant Brent. Defendant Bibby later granted Plaintiff's request in writing, but his grievance seeking further safeguarding of conference rooms was subsequently denied by Defendants Muller and Binnewies.
Plaintiff was found guilty of criminal charges against him and
sentenced to 88 years to life in prison in early 2011.*fn1
Although Plaintiff's complaint is short on factual detail, it
appears that the information obtained through monitoring and/or
recording his conversations with his attorney and psychiatrist was
used against him in his criminal trial.
The Sixth Amendment is meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process, and Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached when the government initiated adversarial proceedings against him. United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). Improper interference by the government with the confidential relationship between a criminal defendant and his counsel violates the Sixth Amendment where the interference substantially prejudices the defendant. Danielson, 325 F.3dd at 1069 (citation and quotation marks omitted). As a result, ...