The opinion of the court was delivered by: Charles F. Eick United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on August 16, 2011, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits. The parties filed a consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on August 26, 2011.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on January 17, 2012. Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 16, 2012. The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See L.R. 7-15; "Order," filed August 17, 2011.
Plaintiff asserts disability since March 1, 2008, based primarily on alleged psychological impairments and alleged headaches (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 150, 159). The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") examined the medical record and heard testimony from Plaintiff, two medical experts, and a vocational expert (A.R. 23-58). Although the ALJ found Plaintiff suffers from "severe" affective mood disorder (bipolar), anxiety disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, and substance addiction disorder, the ALJ also found Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertion levels, albeit with some non-exertional limitations (A.R. 11, 13). According to the ALJ, these limitations restricted Plaintiff to work involving simple, repetitive tasks, no public contact, non-intense contact with co-workers and supervisors, no tasks requiring hypervigilance or responsibility for the safety of others, and no fast paced work (A.R. 13, 16 (adopting psychological medical expert's testimony at A.R. 41)). The ALJ found that a person with these limitations could perform work existing in the national economy as a "store labor person," "electrician helper," and "hand packager" (A.R. 18-19 (adopting vocational expert testimony at A.R. 56-57)). Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 19). The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-3).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff's headaches not severe, in deeming Plaintiff's headache complaints not entirely credible, and in allegedly failing to consider Plaintiff's headaches in determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity.
See Plaintiff's Motion, pp. 2-10. Plaintiff seeks a remand for further administrative proceedings (Id. at 10).
Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
This Court "may not affirm [the Administration's] decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence, but must also consider evidence that detracts from [the Administration's] conclusion." Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and quotations omitted); see Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). However, the Court cannot disturb findings supported by substantial evidence, even though there may exist other evidence supporting Plaintiff's claim. See Torske v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 59, 60 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974); Harvey v. Richardson, 451 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1971).
After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant's motion is granted and Plaintiff's motion is denied. The Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from material*fn1 legal ...