The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. United States District Judge
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND AND THIRD CLAIMS WITH
Defendant California Department of Education ("CDE") moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) for an order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's second and third claims in his First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Plaintiff alleges in his second claim that CDE violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("§ 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; and alleges in his third claim that CDE violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The essence of both claims is that the IDEA imposes on CDE the responsibility to supervise and train administrative law judges ("ALJ") who conduct administrative "due process hearings," including the ALJ who presided over the hearing involving Plaintiff D.A.'s administrative "due process complaint." Plaintiff D.A. ("D.A."), by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Latasha Adams (collectively, "Plaintiff"), opposes the motion.
Decision on CDE's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion requires determination of "whether the complaint's factual allegations, together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim for relief." Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). When determining the sufficiency of a claim, "[w]e accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[; however, this tenet does not apply to] . . . legal conclusions . . . cast in the form of factual allegations." Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Therefore, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007))(stating "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'").
Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that "D.A. is a thirteen-year-old student" who "was first found eligible for special education at age three[.]" (FAC ¶¶ 4 & 10.) D.A. was enrolled in the Fairfield-Suisun Unified School District ("FSUSD") during the 2008-2009 school year and in the Vacaville Unified School District ("VUSD") during the 2009-2010 school year. (FAC ¶¶ 4, 12 & 17-18.) Plaintiff alleges that FSUSD and VUSD failed to properly evaluate and provide D.A. with special educational services recommended by CDE while D.A. was enrolled in these districts. (FAC ¶¶ 14 & 20.)
Plaintiff filed a due process complaint with the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"), in which he alleged VUSD and FSUSD violated the IDEA by failing to conduct necessary assessments and to provide him with state-recommended educational services. (FAC ¶¶ 8 & 18-19.) An ALJ employed by OAH conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning Plaintiff's due process complaint and found in favor of FSUSD and VUSD. (Compl. ¶ 28.)
Plaintiff alleges in his second claim that "D.A. is a person with a disability who is qualified to receive benefits and protections" under § 504; that "[t]he ALJ who heard D.A.'s due process matter was neither fully trained nor appropriately knowledgeable about many aspects of special education law"; and that D.A. was denied the benefit of a due process hearing and a free appropriate public education because CDE "failed to provide an appropriately trained ALJ[.]" (FAC ¶¶ 30, 34, 35 & 42.) Plaintiff alleges in his third claim that CDE violated the IDEA by failing "to appropriately oversee the training of the ALJ and to ensure that [the ALJ] was qualified and knowledgeable to hear and determine the issues raised in the underlying hearing"; and that this failure "resulted in the [adverse ALJ] Decision . . . [and] prevented D.A. from receiving [a free appropriate public education.]" (FAC ¶¶ 47 & 49.)
CDE argues Plaintiff's second and third claims should be dismissed, contending that "Plaintiff has not established any cognizable legal theory against [CDE] which would entitle [him] to relief." (Def.'s Mot. 8:25-26.) CDE argues these claims are "premised on [the ALJ's] decision denying [Plaintiff's] IDEA claims" and "CDE cannot be liable for the purported errors of the independent and impartial hearing office" since "CDE has no role in [OAH] hearings and . . . has complied with its duties to ensure there is a due process procedure in place." (Def.'s Mot. 10:6, 10:18-19 & 11:10-11 (emphasis in original).)
CDE failed to provide [an ALJ] for [Plaintiff's] hearing [who] was fully trained in special education and in related laws . . . . The result of CDE's failure is the Decision which is the subject of [Plaintiff's claims] and which . . . fails to address both the evidence admitted at hearing as well as basic and well established special education laws. The lack of appropriate training of the ALJ is the primary cause of the issuance of an incorrect OAH decision[.]
(Pl.'s Opp'n 5:17-27.) Plaintiff also argues his "allegation that CDE failed to properly oversee the due process hearing system, including the appropriate training of the [ALJ] . . . , is not a conclusory statement[.]" (Pl.'s Opp'n 8:15-20.)
The gravamen of Plaintiff's allegations in the claims at issue is that CDE failed to train and oversee the ALJ who decided Plaintiff's due process complaint; the ALJ's decision was incorrect because the ALJ did not have the appropriate training or knowledge of special education law; and the ALJ's erroneous decision deprived D.A. of a free appropriate public education and a due ...