Plaintiff Richard Greenberg, a state prisoner, is proceeding pro se with this action. The case has been referred to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 72-302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis application that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. The court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227- 28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court are as follows: A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claims and allege facts that state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancements.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claims. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649.
Here, plaintiff's alleges in his complaint as follows. On June 6, 2011, plaintiff was pursued by defendant Garrett Sarcinella, a National Parks Service Law Enforcement Ranger. At the conclusion of the pursuit, plaintiff was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance, reckless driving, evading a peace office, driving without a valid license, and theft and the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle. Plaintiff claims that the defendant Sarcinella's pursuit and detention of him was unlawful, violated plaintiff's rights under the Constitution and caused plaintiff damages. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 7-14.) Plaintiff's complaint, however, is deficient in several respects.
First, the complaint is signed by, and indicates that it was drafted by, "James Nickerson for Richard Lee Greenberg." (Id. at 48.) In this regard, plaintiff has also filed a motion "to appoint James Nickerson as Fiduciary" noting that "James Nickerson is not an Attorney." (Doc. No. 4 at 1.)
The right to represent oneself pro se is personal to the plaintiff and does not extend to other parties. Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962) ("A litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than himself."). Moreover, a non-attorney such as Mr. Nickerson "has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself." C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. U.S., 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987). Individuals who are representing themselves in this court may not delegate the litigation of their claims to any other individual. Local Rule 183(a). Finally, a plaintiff's name, address, and telephone number must be included in the upper left-hand corner and each plaintiff must sign each document filed on behalf of all plaintiffs. Local Rule 131(a) and (b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
Second, the complaint alleges that this action is brought, in part, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that, [e]very person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
In order to state a cognizable claim under § 1983 the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is the plaintiff's burden in bringing a claim under § 1983 to allege, and ultimately establish, that the named defendants were acting under color of state law when they deprived him of a federal right. Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 553-54 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, the complaint alleges that the defendant is a "National Park Services Law Enforcement Ranger" whose "authority of police powers" is authorized pursuant to federal law, specifically 16 U.S.C. § 1a-3. (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 14.) In this regard, it is not apparent how defendant was acting under color of state law when he allegedly deprived plaintiff of a federal right. See Morse v. N. Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir.1997) ("[B]y its very terms, § 1983 precludes liability in federal government actors.")*fn1
Finally, the complaint's fundamental assertion is that plaintiff was convicted as a result of defendant Sarcinella's unlawful actions in contacting, pursuing and arresting plaintiff. In this regard, the complaint alleges that "because of the nature of the contact with the Defendant, [plaintiff] felt it was threatening and reacted and left the area and he assumed that it was his Constitutional Right to do so and not have to explain his actions." (Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 24.) Plaintiff also alleges that "[i]f you do not wish to talk to someone you have the Constitutional Right to ignore them" and that "[n]o reasonable person can conclude by that act, that it represents criminal activity." (Id.) Finally, plaintiff alleges that the defendant "willfully and intentionally pursued Plaintiff in an illegal attempt to imprison him." (Id. at 25.)
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme
Court held that a suit for damages on a civil rights claim*fn2
concerning an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment cannot be maintained absent proof "that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question ...