The opinion of the court was delivered by: The Honorable David O. Carter, Judge
Julie Barrera Not Present Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS: NONE PRESENT NONE PRESENT
PROCEEDING (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s (erroneously sued as JPMorgan Chase National Corporate Services, Inc. & Chase Home Finance LLC) Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ("Mot.") (Dkt. 18). The Court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. The Court has considered the moving, opposing, and replying papers, and hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion to
Taken as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts alleged by Elizabeth Kassahun ("Plaintiff") are as follows:
In June 2006, Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan from Long Beach Mortgage Co. in the amount of $492,000 secured by a Deed of Trust encumbering Plaintiff's home in Anaheim, CA. First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (Dkt. 17) Ex. 1.
At a point in time unspecified, Plaintiff began having trouble making her mortgage payments. Beginning in 2010, Plaintiff entered into a trial loan modification program with Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Defendant") whereby her monthly payment was reduced.*fn1 FAC ¶ 10. Plaintiff contends that if she complied with the terms of the trial modification program, Defendant promised to offer her a permanent loan modification. Id. Plaintiff alleges that she complied with all of the terms of the trial modification program yet Defendant failed to offer her the promised modification.
At a point in time unspecified, a notice of default was recorded by Defendant against Plaintiff's home. Defendant recorded a notice of trustee's sale against the property on April 27, 2011. FAC Ex. 6. The pleadings do not reflect that a sale of Plaintiff's home has yet occurred.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed when a plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal for failure to state a claim does not require the appearance, beyond a doubt, that the plaintiff can prove "no set of facts" in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957)). In order for a complaint to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, it must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v.
, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). A claim for relief is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads enough facts, taken as true, to allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct. Id. at 1949. If the facts only allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is possibly liable, then the complaint must be dismissed. Id. Mere legal conclusions are not to be accepted as true and do not establish a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950.Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will be a context-specific task requiring the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id.
In general, a court cannot consider materials outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). A court may, however, consider items of which it can take judicial notice without ...