The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kendall J. Newman United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff is a federal prisoner, proceeding without counsel and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.*fn1 Plaintiff consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On March 29, 2012, pursuant to court order, plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) ("a judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless."); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. However, "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, id., and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
In the amended complaint, plaintiff re-alleges that he was "touched inappropriately in a sexual manner," and "sexually abused and harassed" by defendant O'Connor. These claims are sufficient to state a potentially cognizable civil rights claim against defendant O'Connor.
Plaintiff also states that defendants DeBruler, Henson, and Bowles "then proceeded to retaliate by violating" plaintiff's First, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 12 at 3.) Plaintiff claims that after he filed complaints against defendant O'Connor, the staff "began joking about being sexually harassed . . . and the harassment and retaliation began right after." (Dkt. No. 12 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he was thrown in the segregated housing unit ("SHU") "on several occasions for asking simple questions in a non-threatening respectful manner." (Id.) Plaintiff claims the first two incident reports were written by Officer J. Plasoln who is a friend and co-worker of defendant O'Connor. Plaintiff alleges he was "forced to pull weeds and [perform] other duties" and threatened to be housed in the SHU if he failed to do the work, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Plaintiff claims he was removed from his food service job after he complained about defendant O'Connor. While not entirely clear, it appears plaintiff claims that defendants Henson, Bowles, DeBruler, Ives, and Babcock allegedly put plaintiff in the SHU because plaintiff asked about prison overcrowding.
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) ("Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent."); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). "A person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) (no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal participation). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of personal participation is insufficient).
Plaintiff's claims under the Thirteenth Amendment are unavailing. Although the Constitution includes, in the Thirteenth Amendment, a general prohibition against involuntary servitude, it expressly excepts from that general prohibition forced labor "as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1; see Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit involuntary servitude as part of imprisonment for a crime.").
Plaintiff's claims of retaliation are vague and conclusory. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, plaintiff must establish that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional security. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff must demonstrate a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1995) (there must be probative evidence to establish a crucial link in the logical chain required to support retaliation; timing alone is insufficient). Plaintiff is required to show that the exercise of his First Amendment rights was chilled, although not necessarily silenced, by the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff promptly contested the charge against him and won); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005). "[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a ...