UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
April 25, 2012
THOMAS J. FORBES,
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, ET AL., DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Michael M. Anello United States District Judge
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REGAIN POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY [Doc. No. 25]
Plaintiff Thomas J. Forbes, proceeding pro se, had filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendants Federal National Mortgage Association, et al. See Doc. No. 4. Plaintiff alleges various causes of action arising out of events related to the foreclosure sale of real property located in Riverside County, California, and his subsequent eviction from the property. This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff's "Motion for Undertaken to Regain Possession of Real Property Located at 1883 Redfield Road, Riverside California 92507 Pending the Final Execution of the Default, Judgment, and Writ of Execution for Possession of Said Property." See Doc. No. 25. Plaintiff requests that the Court return title in the property to his name while this litigation is pending.
Plaintiff essentially seeks injunctive relief. To demonstrate entitlement to such relief, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim(s); (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Plaintiff fails to satisfy any of these elements.
Furthermore, according to Plaintiff, "[a]s of February 27,2012 the property located at 1883 Redfield Road, Riverside California 92507 has become vacant due to a lockout of the subject property performed by the Riverside County Sheriff's Department upon the Plaintiff and is vacant and not inhabited by any party." See Motion, 3. The Court infers based on Plaintiff's representation that a state court judgment was issued against Plaintiff, as well as writ of possession requiring him to vacate the real property. This Court has no jurisdiction to provide appellate review of the state court action, according to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041-1042 (9th Cir.2005) ("Typically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a party losing in state court seeks what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156, 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2003) (Rooker prohibits de facto appeals of the state court decisions in federal court and Feldman prohibits a federal district court from considering any issue that "inextricably intertwined"); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 292-293 (2005) (The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars "cases brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments").
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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