(Super. Ct. No. CM031240)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hull , J.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Defendant George Charles Snow owned a paving company in Massachusetts. He came to California to pursue a business opportunity at the request of his cousin, co-defendant George Stanley. Defendant and Stanley met with the managing officers of Porrero McLaughlin, Inc., a construction firm. Defendant and Stanley obtained one of the firm's business cards, but were not offered employment or authorized to do work on behalf of Porrero McLaughlin.
Defendant and Stanley, who were not licensed contractors, used the Porrero McLaughlin card to pose as licensed asphalt contractors from the firm. They contracted with a church to pave the driveway for no more than $6,000 and were paid $10,400. The work was incomplete and substandard, and cost $41,438 to correct. They also paved three driveways for individuals, for respective prices of $1,500, $11,000, and $2,500.
Defendant pleaded no contest to four counts of grand theft by false pretenses (Pen. Code, §§ 487, 532) and one count of contracting without a license (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7028, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years' formal probation, subject to various conditions including a 180 days' term in county jail and paying victim restitution.
Defendant appeals. He did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON , Acting P. J. MURRAY , J.
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