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Tyson Joiel Suggs v. Vimal Singh

May 29, 2012

TYSON JOIEL SUGGS, PETITIONER,
v.
VIMAL SINGH, WARDEN, RESPONDENT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kendall J. Newman United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with an application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Both parties consented to proceed before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On April 20, 2012, the court ordered petitioner to file an opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss within twenty-one days. Twenty-one days have now passed, and petitioner has not filed further opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss. As petitioner was previously informed, Local Rule 230(l) provides in part: "Failure of the responding party to file written opposition or to file a statement of no opposition may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion . . . ."

Respondent contends, inter alia, that the instant petition is time-barred.

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") was enacted. Section 2244(d)(1) of Title 8 of the United States Code provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that "the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward" the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

III. Chronology

For purposes of the statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this case is as follows: 1. On April 19, 2000, petitioner's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to three years in state prison. On July 21, 2000, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, dismissed petitioner's appeal as non-operable.

2. On November 8, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the California Court of Appeal, which ...


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