The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. United States District Judge
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney S. ROBERT TICE-RASKIN Assistant U.S. Attorney 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2738 Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. Defendant first appeared before Magistrate Judge Newman, a judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending, on May 10, 2012. On that date, this matter was set for status on June 8, 2012 before Judge Burrell. In addition, at the request of defendant, for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from May 10 through June 8, 2012, was deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and B (iv) [Local Code T4].
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 6, 2012 and to exclude time between June 8, 2012 and July 6, 2012 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the court find the following:
a. The government has represented that there is voluminous discovery associated with the case which includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form (approximately 2,000 pages of documents (209 MB of .pdf documents)) and hundreds of pages of materials obtained via grand jury subpoena. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation related to the charges, to review and potentially copy discovery for this matter, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Counsel for defendant has specifically discussed all of the contents of this stipulation with his client and represents that his client concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
f. Defendant Kathe Rascher has specifically discussed all of the contents of this stipulation with her counsel and represents that she concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original dates prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
h. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 4, 2012 to July 6. 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the judge at defendant's request on the basis of the judge's finding that the ends of justice ...