UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
June 5, 2012
MELANIE C. LATRONICA,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, Jr. United States District Judge
Plaintiff Melanie C. Latronica previously moved for an "Emergency Protective Order" on grounds that she is "a victim of technology that's in my mind and in my neck and head." She claims to "being tapped out and violated" and states that she has "been a victim for over ten years and just recently my head was cut open." Concurrently with the above-described motion, filed on April 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a three-page complaint that appears to allege "civil rights" and a "technical violation in my body", among other contentions. At least in the caption to the complaint, Plaintiff requests a "madatory (sic) injunction".
This Court construed Plaintiff's Motion as an application for temporary restraining order and, by Order dated April 27, 2012, denied that application on several procedural grounds, including Plaintiff's failure to submit an affidavit detailing her efforts to provide notice to the defendants, or, alternatively, the reasons why such notice should not have been provided, as required by Local Rule 231(c)(5).
Plaintiff subsequently filed both a supplement to her complaint and supporting declaration on May 16, 2012. Then, on May 31, 2012, Plaintiff filed yet another request for an "emergency protective order", this time against a Mark Churchill who, as far as this Court can ascertain, was not even mentioned in any of Plaintiff's previous filings with the court. Plaintiff appears to claim that Churchill has intercepted her phone lines, "has had people terrorizing [her] nonstop", and has had her car totaled. Plaintiff goes on to explain that "every apartment I've lived in has technology in the walls". She argues that she has been the victim of cybernetics and cyber-slavery and asks that this Court make Churchill divulge to whom she may have been "sold".
Plaintiff still has not established how she has provided any notice to any defendant here of the relief she now once again seeks. Even more fundamentally, there is no clear indication of what Mark Churchill did, or even whether he is a party to this lawsuit against whom any injunctive relief can be had. Plaintiff's latest application, along with the other documents previously provided to the Court, are all but incomprehensible.
In order to qualify for injunctive relief, Plaintiff must, at minimum, demonstrate a "fair chance of success" that her claims will ultimately prevail on their merits. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calif. State Bd. Of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). This means that Plaintiff must demonstrate some likelihood of obtaining a favorable result in her case in chief. Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1005, fn. 3 (9th Cir. 2001). No matter how severe or irreparable the injury asserted, an injunction should never issue if the moving party's claims are so legally untenable that there is virtually no chance of prevailing on the merits. State of Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A. 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975).
The inherent implausibility of the claims asserted by Plaintiff makes it impossible for this Court to conclude there is any likelihood she will ultimately prevail. Consequently, the requested temporary restraining order cannot issue. Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief (ECF No. 8) is accordingly DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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