The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hayes, Judge:
The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Willmark Communities, Inc. and Prominence Willmark Communities, Inc. (ECF No. 10).
On January 18, 2012, Plaintiffs Rafael Nafes and Fahega Suljuki Nafes initiated this action by filing a complaint. (ECF No. 1). On February 8, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") against Willmark Communities, Inc. ("Willmark") and Prominence Willmark Communities, Inc. ("Prominence"). (ECF No. 3).
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they were tenants in Defendants' apartment in San Marcos, California, from July 2009 to March 2011. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("Rosenthal Act") by billing Plaintiffs for move-out charges to which Defendants were not entitled, falsely representing the character and amount of the debt owed, communicating with Plaintiffs after being notified that Plaintiffs were represented by counsel, using rude, abusive, and harassing language in telephone calls made to collect the alleged debt, and threatening to forward Plaintiffs' account to collections after Plaintiffs disputed the debt. Plaintiffs allege that "Plaintiffs sued [D]efendant Prominence in small claims court resulting in a judgment against Defendant Prominence for the wrongful retention of the security deposit." Id. at 4.
On March 1, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and request for judicial notice. (ECF Nos. 10, 10-3). Defendants contend that the claims asserted by Plaintiff in this case are barred by res judicata because the claims were, or should have been, litigated in the state court small claims case. On March 19, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiffs contend that the claims asserted in this case allege harms to separate primary rights that were not litigated in small claims court and that the claims are not barred by res judicata. On March 26, 2012, Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 12).
I. Request for Judicial Notice
Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the case in filed by Plaintiff Fahega Nafes in small claims court and the judgment in that case. (ECF No. 10-3). A court "may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue." Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir.2007) quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n. 2 (9th Cir.2002).
The Court takes judicial notice that on August 10, 2011, Plaintiff Fahega Nafes filed a claim against Defendant Prominence in San Diego County Superior Court small claims court for $7,500. (ECF No. 10-3 at 4-6). In that case, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Prominence "has not given me any accounts of the charges against me. This is my security deposit." Id. at 5. Plaintiff stated that the amount owed by Defendant Prominence was: "Security deposit $224 CC Section 1950.5 ($448) additional charges $1,348 punitives $5480." Id. The Court takes judicial notice that on September 13, 2011, judgment was issued in Plaintiff Fahega Nafes's small claims case against Defendant Prominence in the amount of $150 principal and $75 costs. Id. at 8-9.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To sufficiently state a claim to relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" but the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all "well-pleaded factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). However, a court is not "required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 2009). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).
"Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). A federal court must give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as would the courts of the state in which it was rendered. Chao v. A-One Medical Services, Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 921 (2003) citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Under California law, the elements of res judicata and collateral estoppel are the same: "(1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being ...