The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dennis L. Beck United States Magistrate Judge
EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER
FINDINGS AND ORDER
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his/her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 25, 2012 at 1:00pm.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 13, 2012 at 1:00pm and to exclude time between June 25, 2012 and August 13, 2012. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that all of the discovery in this case has been either produced directly to counsel or made available for inspection and copying, and a plea offer has been made.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time for forensic analysis of certain discovery, which requires funding. Counsel for Mr. Alexander timely filed a request for such funding, which the District Court Judge initially denied. The District Court Judge has agreed to conduct an ex parte hearing on the expert funding issue on Monday, June 25, 2012. The continuance being requested will permit defense counsel to complete necessary investigation and preparation in order to determine whether the case can be settled or will proceed to trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 25, 2012 to August 13, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: [DATE]. /s/ Elana S. Landau ELANA S. LANDAU Assistant United States Attorney DATED: [DATE]. /s/ Patience Milrod PATIENCE MILROD ...