STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 2, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 23, 2012, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between July 2, 2012 and July 23, 2012, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 150 pages of documents from defendant's immigration A file. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to review discovery for this matter.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 2, 2012 to July 23, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: June 28, 2012 /s/ Christopher S. Hales CHRISTOPHER S. HALES Special Assistant U.S. Attorney DATED: June 28, 2012 /s/ M.Petrik MICHAEL PETRIK, JR. Counsel for Defendant