IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
June 28, 2012
JAMES T. CASE, PLAINTIFF,
BOARD OF PRISON TERMS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gregory G. Hollows United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed February 15, 2012, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint and to file an in forma pauperis affidavit. Plaintiff was subsequently granted an extension of time for his filings. See docket # 12. Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint and completed an in forma pauperis application. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. See docket # 9.
Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
A complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235 (3d ed. 2004). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843 (1969).
Plaintiff's original filing, transferred from the Northern District of California, was dismissed because, inter alia, it was unclear whether he sought to proceed on a civil rights complaint or a habeas corpus petition. Plaintiff was instructed to file an amended civil rights complaint and, if he sought to file a habeas corpus petition, to file a separate action. See Order, filed on 2/15/12 (dkt # 10).
In his amended complaint, plaintiff has failed to sufficiently cure the defects of his original filing. He lists the following as defendants: Christine Brunger, RN at California State Prison-Solano (CSP-Sol); Warden Swarthout; Lisa Austin; Dr. Lipson; Dr. M. Capline. Plaintiff contends that on 4/17/11, he wanted to see a doctor for blurry vision and migraine headaches, but was seen instead by an unidentified MTA who provided plaintiff with a pair of reading glasses (for which he was charged $9.00), but who said the doctor was too busy to see him and was otherwise not particularly sympathetic to plaintiff's symptoms. Plaintiff put in to see a doctor and on 5/3/11 was seen by an RN (identified as Nurse B--possibly, defendant Brunger). He showed this RN blood on his pillow case, saying that he had migraines and blood had been leaking from both of his ears. On 6/7/11, plaintiff (apparently again) saw Nurse B, told her he would not "shut up" until he was seen by a doctor; she was "snotty and acted put out" and still refused to let plaintiff see a doctor. On 6/14/11, he nevertheless saw defendant Dr. Lipson who said he found nothing wrong. Plaintiff claims that he still has not seen an eye doctor, he still has migraine headaches for which he has, apparently, only very recently received aspirin and his back still hurts, although his ears have "quit leaking." Plaintiff seeks both money (and, possibly, punitive) damages and injunctive relief in the form of an exam by an "eye doctor," as well as a different doctor for his back. Amended Complaint (AC), pp. 2-4.
Plaintiff begins his amended complaint by stating that upon filing the instant amended complaint, he will be transferred and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) will say the issue has been rendered moot. It does appear from plaintiff's latest filing that, although his claims concern events at CSP-Sol, he has since been transferred to Jamestown (Sierra Conservation Center), which the Clerk of the Court has not yet noted in the case docket. See dkt # 18. Plaintiff appended a letter to his amended complaint, directed to the undersigned, wherein plaintiff complains that CSP-Sol "is the most corrupt prison" he has been in during the past 28 years of his incarceration, averring that the 602 he filed related to the claims of this case is located in his property which he has been unsuccessful in retrieving while he is in administrative segregation for his own safety. AC, p. 5. Plaintiff subsequently filed a copy of a 602 grievance filed on 5/15/11 regarding a portion of his allegations in the instant action, as well as a first level appeal response, dated 6/20/11, and a copy of a health services request, filed on 4/29/11. Dkt # 17. In another filing, plaintiff appears to be saying that he would prefer to be transferred to Jamestown, averring he never intends to be returned to CSP-Sol, speaking about having contracted valley fever at Avenal State Prison and about his inhaler and Cpap device which Cpap at night helps him breathe but is noisy to cellmates; he references his single cell status which he wants to retain and also talks about his mother being on kidney dialysis and how he has "asked for a hardship transfer to anywhere in Northern California" (dkt # 15) -- none of which appears to have anything to do with the gravamen of his amended complaint.
In order to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976). To prevail, plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1992) (on remand). The requisite state of mind for a medical claim is "deliberate indifference." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998 (1992).
A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment are the following: the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. See, e.g., Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332');">900 F. 2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1989). McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) the Supreme Court defined a very strict standard which a plaintiff must meet in order to establish "deliberate indifference." Of course, negligence is insufficient. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S. Ct. at 1978. However, even civil recklessness (failure to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm which is so obvious that it should be known) is insufficient. Id. at 836-37, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. Neither is it sufficient that a reasonable person would have known of the risk or that a defendant should have known of the risk. Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.
A prison official acts with "deliberate indifference ... only if the [prison official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety." Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir.2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the prison official must not only "be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists," but that person "must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). "If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk." Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). FN4 This "subjective approach" focuses only "on what a defendant's mental attitude actually was." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839, 114 S.Ct. 1970. "Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights." McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (alteration and citation omitted).
FN4. In a recent case, we recognized that "deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm." Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9th Cir.2003) (citations omitted); see also Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197 (acknowledging that a plaintiff may demonstrate that officers "must have known" of a risk of harm by showing the obvious and extreme nature of a detainee's abnormal behavior). 
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004).
Also significant to the analysis is the well established principle that mere differences of opinion concerning the appropriate treatment cannot be the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330 (9th Cir. 1996); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
Moreover, a physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate that inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id.
Additionally, mere delay in medical treatment without more is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the delay in medical treatment must be harmful, there is no requirement that the delay cause "substantial" harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1339-1340 (9th Cir. 1990) and Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998- 1000. A finding that an inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant's action or inaction tends to provide additional support for a claim of deliberate indifference; however, it does not end the inquiry. McGuckin, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992). In summary, "the more serious the medical needs of the prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant's actions in light of those needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has established deliberate indifference on the part of the defendant." McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1061.
Superimposed on these Eighth Amendment standards is the fact that in cases involving complex medical issues where plaintiff contests the type of treatment he received, expert opinion will almost always be necessary to establish the necessary level of deliberate indifference. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, although there may be subsidiary issues of fact in dispute, unless plaintiff can provide expert evidence that the treatment he received equated with deliberate indifference thereby creating a material issue of fact, summary judgment should be entered for defendants. The dispositive question is ultimately not what was the most appropriate course of treatment for plaintiff, but whether the failure to timely give a certain type of treatment was, in essence, criminally reckless.
Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights in his amended complaint. In the first place, he does
not link at least two named defendants to any allegations whatever. In
the second place, he does not adequately identify the defendant he
refers to as "Nurse B" within his allegations, and even had he done
so, his claims against this individual simply do not rise to the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation. At most, she delayed his seeing a
doctor, who, according to plaintiff, when he did see one, could find
nothing wrong with him. As for defendant Dr. Lipson, the allegation
against him is simply that he did not find what was causing
plaintiff's complaints. Plaintiff needs to fully identify the MTA and
the RN he believes provided him with inadequate medical care and to
make clear that he suffers from a serious medical condition to which
they were deliberately indifferent. He must also allege how defendant
Dr. Lipson's actions or inactions rose to the level of an
Amendment violation. Moreover, although it is not entirely clear, it
appears that plaintiff may have failed to administratively exhaust his
claims through the final level, which defendants, should any
ultimately be served, may raise as an affirmative defense.*fn1
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
provides that, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."
Inmates seeking injunctive relief must exhaust administrative
remedies. Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). In Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731,741, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001), the Supreme
Court held that inmates must exhaust administrative remedies,
regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.
Therefore, inmates seeking money damages must also completely exhaust
their administrative remedies. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.
Ct. 1819 (inmates seeking money damages are required to exhaust
administrative remedies even where the grievance process does not
permit awards of money damages). Finally, plaintiff has now
transferred to SCC at Jamestown, which is located in Tuolumne County.
Should he have complaints regarding his treatment there, any civil
rights action regarding Jamestown officials should be filed in the
Fresno Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California. See Local Rule 120(d). The instant amended
complaint will be dismissed but plaintiff will be granted one further
opportunity to amend as to his allegations against the CSP-Sol
If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update plaintiff's current address by reference to docket # 18.
2. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court's order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
4. The amended complaint is dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file a second amended complaint within twenty-eight days from the date of service of this order. Failure to file a second amended complaint will result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed.