UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
July 5, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
CESAR MOLINA-MEJIA, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Chief United States District Judge
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney ANDREW L. GRADMAN Special Assistant U.S. Attorney 2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 Fresno, California 93721 Telephone: (559) 497-4000 Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 Attorneys for the United States of America
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his/her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 9, 2012 at 10:00 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until July 16, 2012 at 10:00 a.m. and to exclude time between July 9, 2012 and July 16, 2012 under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
A. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 98 pages of documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
B. Counsel for defendant desires additional time for the following: Review of discovery; discussion of fast-track plea offer with defendant; defense preparation. In addition, the current status conference poses a time conflict, and as a panel appointee, counsel must personally appear on the matter.
C. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
D. The government does not object to the continuance.
E. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
F. Exclusion of time: For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 9, 2012 to July 16, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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