The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, Jr. United States District Judge
STIPULATION CONTINUING STATUS
CONFERENCE AND FINDING
EXCLUDABLE TIME UNDER SPEEDY
TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Nazhmudin Rustamov, by and through his counsel, Clemente M. Jimenez, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 5, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 9, 2012 and to exclude time between July 5, 2012 and August 9, 2012 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The defendant made his initial appearance in this district on May 23, 2012. On May 24, 2012, the government provided defense counsel with 1,574 pages of discovery consisting of investigative reports, loan and escrow files, bank records, and related documents.
b. Counsel for defendant has indicated that he needs additional time to review this material, consult with his client, and otherwise familiarize himself with the case.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from July 5, 2012 to August 9, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: July 3, 2012 /s/ R. Steven Lapham R. STEVEN LAPHAM Assistant United States Attorney DATED: July 3, 2012 /s/ Clemente M. Jimenez ...