UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
July 5, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. United States District Judge
DONALD H. HELLER, SBN 55717 DONALD H. HELLER, A Law Corporation 701 University Avenue, Suite 100 Sacramento, CA 95825 Telephone: (916) 974-3500 Facsimile: (916) 520-3497 Attorneys for Defendant Kathe Rascher
STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUING STATUS AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;[PROPOSED FINDINGS AND ORDER]
It is hereby stipulated and agreed between Plaintiff, United States of America by and through Assistant United States Attorney S. Robert Tice-Raskin, Esq. and Donald H. Heller, Esq., attorney for the defendant Kathe Rascher that:
1. Defendant first appeared before Magistrate Judge Newman, a judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending, on May 10, 2012. On that date, this matter was set for status on June 8, 2012 before Judge Burrell.
2. On May 24, 2012, Donald H. Heller, Esq., was appointed by Judge Burrell to represent the defendant and substituted in as counsel for the defendant in place of the Federal Defender. By stipulation executed on June 4, 2012, the matter was continued for a status conference before Judge Burrell on July 6, 2012. The court based on the stipulation made appropriate finding of excludable time through July 6, 2012.
3. The parties hereto agree to continue this case by stipulation from July 6, 2012 to August 3, 2012, at the request of the defendant so as to allow the defendant through counsel to properly assess all aspects of this case and in particular, two areas of concern, to wit, an independent calculation of the loss in issue by an outside consultant and an assessment of the defendant by an outside consultant health care professional for potential sentencing purposes. Additionally, the defendant with the permission of Mr. Sheehan of Pretrial Services is presently in Anchorage, Alaska tending to her daughter for pre-childbirth and post-childbirth care. The defendant is returning to California on July 6, 2012 and will be meeting with Mr. Heller after July 6, 2012, to review discovery and assist in her defense.
4. It is anticipated that by next court appearance on August 3, 2012, the defendant will be able to provide to the Court a reasonable assessment as to when this case will be disposed of by entry of a plea. As indicated the issues that Mr. Heller needs to competently investigate is the amount of loss and whether there is exist sentencing consideration which would result in a departure and/or sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), both essential for providing the defendant with effective assistance of counsel.
5. Based on the above stated defense preparation and assessment it is agreed and indeed, requested by the defendant that for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from July 6, 2012 through August 3, 2012, be deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and B (iv) [Local Code T4].
6. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. That substantial factual basis has been presented by this stipulation to continue this matter to August 3, 2012, for a status conference;
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Counsel for defendant has specifically communicated all of the contents of this stipulation with his client and represents that his client concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original dates prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 6, 2012 to August 3, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the judge at defendant's request on the basis of the judge's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
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