IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
July 6, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JUAN LOPEZ ALVARADO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge: Honorable John A. Mendez
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874) ATTORNEY AT LAW 1111 H Street, # 204 Sacramento, CA. 95814 (916) 444-3994 Fax (916) 447-0931 Attorney for Defendant FRED PINEDA
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; AND ORDER
Date: August 7, 2012
Time: 9:45 a.m.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Michael M. Beckwith, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Edward Michael Tulysewski, Michael L. Chastaine, Esq., counsel for defendant Estanislao Garcia, Arturo Hernandez, Esq., counsel for defendant Fred Pineda, John R. Manning, Esq., and counsel for defendant Jose Mario Medrano, Matthew McCrary Scoble, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on July 10, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until August 7, 2012 at 9:45 a.m. and to exclude time between July 10, 2012 and August 7, 2012 under the Local Codes T-2 (unusual or complex case) and T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a complex case, including 5,000 pages of discovery as well as three discs of recorded phone calls (containing hundreds of recorded conversations), and five co-defendants (a total of 13 Indicted). Some defendants are currently incarcerated at the Butte County Jail in Oroville, California; approximately 120 miles roundtrip from downtown Sacramento.
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery; review investigation reports; discuss USSG calculations with defendants; and, review proposed plea agreements.
c. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of July 10, 2012 to August 7, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Codes T-2 and T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
John A. Mendez United States District Court Judge
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