The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge: Honorable John A. Mendez
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874) ATTORNEY AT LAW 1111 H Street, # 204 Sacramento, CA. 95814 (916) 444-3994 Fax (916) 447-0931 Attorney for Defendant EDWARD SHEVTSOV
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS
UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Date: October 9, 2012
Time: 9:45 a.m.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Steven Lapham, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Vera Kuzmenko, Bruce Locke, Esq., counsel for defendant Nadia Kuzmenko, aka Nadia Reyes, Scott L. Tedmon, Esq., counsel for defendant Aaron New, Hayes H. Gable, III, Esq., counsel for defendant Edward Shevtsov, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Peter Kuzmenko, Michael L. Chastaine, counsel for defendant Sergey Blizenko, Michael D. Long, Esq., counsel for defendant Vanik Atoyan, Gary A. Talesfore, Esq., counsel for defendant Rachel Siders, Eduardo G. Roy, Esq., and counsel for defendant Leah Isom, Candace A. Fry, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on July 10, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 9, 2012 and to exclude time between July 10, 2012 and October 9, 2012 under the Local Codes T-2 (unusual or complex case) and T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a complex case, including over 35,000 pages of discovery and nine co-defendants. The Government has further indicated it has several "bankers boxes" of discovery available for review at the U.S. Attorney's Office.
b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses. It is anticipated counsel for the defendants will be in a position to set jury trial dates at the next (proposed) status conference.
c. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of July 10, 2012 to October 9, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Codes T-2 and T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.