IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
July 9, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
RICARDO VENEGAS AND VIRGILIO PINEDA,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge: Honorable Garland E. Burrell, Jr.
JOHN R. MANNING (SBN 220874) ATTORNEY AT LAW 1111 H Street, # 204 Sacramento, CA. 95814 (916) 444-3994 Fax (916) 447-0931 Attorney for Defendant RICARDO VENEGAS
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER Date: September 7, 2012 Time: 9:00 a.m.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jill Thomas, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Ricardo Venegas, John R. Manning, Esq., and counsel for defendant Virgilio Pineda, David Fischer, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on July 13, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 7, 2012 and to exclude time between July 13, 2012 and September 7, 2012 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
b. This court has recently approved funding for Dayle Carlson, sentencing expert. Mr. Carlson will need time to review the discovery; indictment; proposed plea agreement; meet with counsel and Mr. Venegas to discuss potential mitigation issues. After which, Mr. Carlson will assist counsel for Mr. Venegas in preparing a written counter offer to the government in hopes of resolving the matter.
c. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of July 13, 2012 to September 7, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. Senior United States District Judge
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