BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney LAUREL J. MONTOYA Assistant United States Attorneys 2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 Fresno, CA 93721 Telephone: (559) 497-4000 Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 Attorneys for Plaintiff
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his/her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 16, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 27, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. and to exclude time between July 16, 2012 and August 27, 2012 under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 508 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form as well as approximately 25 CDs of interviews, photographs and video recordings. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client and the government as plea negotiations continue to be active and ongoing. Offers have been conveyed, counteroffers have been made, and plea agreements have been prepared as to several of the defendants that are reasonably likely to result in the resolution.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and resolution, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 16, 2012 to August 27, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.