UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
July 17, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JUAN CARLOS MORA-LOPEZ, AKA JUAN CARLOS MORA DEFENDANT.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 17, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 28, 2012, and to exclude time between July 17, 2012 and August 28, 2012, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 65 pages of documents from defendant's immigration A file. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. In particular, defense counsel is continuing to research defendant's claim to derivative citizenship, which affects defendant's defenses to the indictment and requires a substantial amount of time-consuming factual investigation. Specifically, the defense is presently completing its under-oath declarations for review and signing by those witnesses with personal knowledge in support of defendant's claim to derivative citizenship. Additional time is necessary to provide these witnesses with declarations, in some instances to translate the declarations into Spanish, and then to review them with the witnessers for editing and signature.
c. The defendant himself was moved by the U.S. Marshal
Service from Sacramento County Jail to the county jail in Oroville, where he remains as of this writing. His geographical distance from the defense (a one and a half-hour drive without traffic) delays completion of his claim to citizenship, as it is now far more difficult to consult with the defendant than it was before he was moved.
4. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
5. The government does not object to the continuance. 6. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
7. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 17, 2012 to August 28, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
8. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: July 12, 2012. /s/ Christopher S. Hales CHRISTOPHER S. HALES Special Assistant U.S. Attorney DATED: July 12, 2012. /s/ Caro Marks CARO MARKS Counsel for Defendant
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