IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
July 24, 2012
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF,
DOLORES M. UNDERWOOD, AND INDIVIDUAL, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kendall J. Newman United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Presently before the court is plaintiff's motion to remand this
unlawful detainer action to the Superior Court of California for the
County of Sacramento ("Superior Court") (Dkt. Nos. 7).*fn1
No written opposition or other response to plaintiff's motion
to remand was filed. Because oral argument would not materially aid
the resolution of the pending motion, this matter is submitted on the
briefs and record without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); E.
Dist. Local Rule 230(g). Having reviewed the moving papers and record
in this case, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff's motion to
remand be granted and that this case be remanded to the
Superior Court on the grounds that this court lacks federal subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's unlawful detainer claim.
On March 5, 2012, plaintiff initiated a limited civil case*fn3
in the Superior Court by
filing a Verified Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, which notes in the
caption that the amount demanded is "Up To $10,000" ("Complaint").
(Compl. at 1, attached as Ex. A to Notice of Removal.) Plaintiff seeks
to recover possession of the subject residential property located in
Sacramento, California. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 8, and prayer for relief.)
In regards to the named defendant, defendant Dolores M. Underwood has not appeared in this case. It appears that Dolores M. Underwood is deceased and that Mark F. Underwood, who removed this case to federal court, claims to be a successor owner and successor defendant to Ms. Underwood. (See, e.g., Memo. of P. & A. In Supp. of Demurrer at 1 ("The subject property was owned by Mark F. Underwood."); Notice of Removal at 1 (Mark F. Underwood refers to himself as "defendant"); Notice of Interested Parties at 2 (referring to Mark F. Underwood as "Defendant being wrongfully evicted").) The court's docket reflects that in removing this case, Mr. Underwood paid the required filing fee "[for the benefit of] Dolores M. Underwood, deceased." At a minimum, the parties appear to agree that Mr. Underwood has been residing in the subject property.
The Complaint alleges that on or about January 3, 2012, plaintiff became the owner of the subject property by purchasing it at a trustee's sale following foreclosure proceedings, and that plaintiff perfected title in its own name. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-8.) Attached to the Notice of Removal is a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale recorded with the Sacramento County Recorder's office on January 18, 2012, which reflects the conveyance of the property to plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about February 24, 2012, it served defendant, by mail and posting at the property, with a notice to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the property within three days.*fn4 (Compl. ¶ 10; see also Notice to Occupant to Vacate Premises, Feb. 22, 2012, attached to Notice of Removal.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant, in effect Mr. Underwood, failed to timely vacate and deliver possession of the property and continues to possess and occupy the property. (See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11.) Through this action, plaintiff seeks:
(1) immediate delivery of the premises, and (2) costs of suit. (Id. at 3.)
Mark Underwood claims to have demurred to the Complaint in the Superior Court, although none of the demurrer-related documents are file-stamped or dated. (See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 1, 8; see also id., Ex. B.) Mr. Underwood's demurrer was "based on a defective notice, i.e., the Notice to Occupants to Vacate Premises, failed to comply with The Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act [12 U.S.C. §5220]." (Notice of Removal ¶ 8; accord id. ¶ 1; see also Notice of Demurrer & Demurrer at 3.) The Notice of Removal alleges that the Superior Court overruled the demurrer. (Notice of Removal ¶ 9.) Mr. Underwood appears to have ultimately filed an answer to the Complaint, although the copy of the answer attached to the Notice of Removal is not dated or file-stamped.
On June 14, 2012, Mark Underwood removed this unlawful detainer action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), asserting that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.*fn5 (Notice of Removal ¶¶ 6, 10.) He asserts that "[f]ederal question jurisdiction exists because Defendants' [sic] demurrer, a pleading depend [sic] on the determination of Defendants' [sic] rights and Plaintiff's duties under federal law." (Id. ¶ 10.) The implication of Mr. Underwood's statement appears to be that he believes this case was removable on the basis of a defense to the unlawful detainer action premised on the adequacy of the notice to quit under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009.
On June 25, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion to remand, and on June 27, 2012, filed a re-noticed motion that is before the court. Plaintiff argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over its single unlawful detainer claim and that Mark Underwood's removal was untimely.*fn6
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
In relevant part, the federal removal statute provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010). "The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction," id., and removal jurisdiction "must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance" Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, a federal court has an independent duty to assess whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, whether or not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that "the district court had a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not"); accord Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996). Because subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties, a district court must remand a case if it lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Kelton Arms Condominium Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.").
Mark Underwood's Notice of Removal asserts that removal was proper on the basis of the court's federal question jurisdiction. (See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 6, 10.) For the reasons that follow, the undersigned concludes that the removal was defective because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim.
District courts have federal question jurisdiction over "all civil actions that arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "A case 'arises under' federal law either where federal law creates the cause of action or 'where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.'" Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002) (modification in original) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983)). "[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d at 1091; see also Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Ordinarily, the existence of federal question jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint."). "In determining the existence of removal jurisdiction, based upon a federal question, the court must look to the complaint as of the time the removal petition was filed. Jurisdiction is based on the complaint as originally filed . . . ." Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., 300 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, plaintiff filed its Complaint in the Superior Court asserting a single claim for unlawful detainer premised solely on California law. Because a claim for unlawful detainer does not by itself present a federal question or necessarily turn on the construction of federal law, no basis for federal question jurisdiction appears on the face of the Complaint. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tyler, No. C 10-4033 PJH, 2010 WL 4918790, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010) (unpublished) (concluding that a single claim for unlawful detainer under state law does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction); OneWest Bank FSB v. Ignacio, No. CIV S-10-1683 JAM DAD PS, 2010 WL 2696702, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (unpublished) (same); IndyMac Federal Bank, F.S.B. v. Ocampo, No. EDCV 09-2337 PA (DTBx), 2010 WL 234828, *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (unpublished) (same); HSBC Bank, N.A. v. Bryant, No. 09-CV-1659-IEG (POR), 2009 WL 3787195, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (unpublished) (same).
Despite the fact that Mr. Underwood failed to oppose plaintiff's motion to remand, the undersigned briefly addresses the suggestion in the Notice of Removal that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim because plaintiff's three-day notice to vacate the premises allegedly violated the Protecting Tenants At Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702, 123 Stat. 1660 (2009) (the "Act"). (See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 8-10.) Insofar as Mr. Underwood's argument is concerned, the Act provides protections to tenants who reside in properties subject to foreclosure, including the requirement that a 90-day notice to vacate be given to bona fide tenants. See SD Coastline LP v. Buck, No. 10CV2108 MMA (NLS), 2010 WL 4809661, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) (unpublished).
As an initial matter, it does not appear that Mark Underwood was a bona fide tenant who resided in a foreclosed property. Instead, it appears, at least on the basis of Mr. Underwood's representations in his demurrer, that he is a former owner of the subject property who was subjected to foreclosure proceedings. (See Memo. of P. & A. In Supp. of Demurrer at 1 ("The subject property was owned by Mark F. Underwood.").) Accordingly, it is questionable whether the Act even applied to Mr. Underwood.
In any event, federal courts have consistently rejected attempts to
premise federal subject matter jurisdiction on the 90-day notice
provision provided in the Act. See, e.g., Parkland Sec., Inc. v.
Carey, Civ. No. S-11-3281 GEB GGH PS, 2012 WL 159621, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 18, 2012) (unpublished), adopted by 2012 WL 458433 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 2012) (unpublished); Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, No. CV
10-8203 GAF (SSx), 2010 WL 4916578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010)
(unpublished); SD Coastline LP, 2010 WL 4809661, at *2-3; Aurora Loan
Servs., LLC v. Martinez, No. C10-01260 HRL, 2010 WL 1266887, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010) (unpublished). Such rejection is based on
the fact that an argument relying on the Act's notice provision is an
attempt to premise this court's subject matter jurisdiction on a
defense or a counterclaim. An anticipated defense or counterclaim
cannot establish a federal question because such a defense or
counterclaim does not appear on the face of the complaint.*fn7
See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (stating
that federal question jurisdiction cannot "rest upon an actual or
anticipated counterclaim"); accord Takeda v. Nw. Nat'l Life Ins Co.,
765 F.2d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp.,
F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) ("A federal law defense to a
state-law claim does not confer jurisdiction on a federal court, even
if the defense is that of federal preemption and is anticipated in the
plaintiff's complaint."); SD Coastline LP, 2010 WL 4809661, at *2-3
(concluding that unlawful detainer defendant's claim or defense based
on the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 cannot serve as a
basis for removal jurisdiction).
In short, no federal question is present on the face of plaintiff's Complaint. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not provide this court with subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's single claim for unlawful detainer brought pursuant to California law.
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to remand is submitted without a hearing, and the August 2, 2012 hearing on plaintiff's motion is VACATED.
It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion to remand (Dkt. No. 7) be granted and that this matter be remanded to the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento.
2. This case be closed and all dates vacated.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also E. Dist. Local Rule 304(b). Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. E. Dist. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED.