The opinion of the court was delivered by: Barbara A. McAuliffe United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [Doc. 19]
On July 13, 2012, the Court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and judgment was entered in favor of Respondent.*fn1
On July 26, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's July 13, 2012, order. In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner seeks reconsideration by a District Judge and claims that the undersigned was biased and prejudiced concerning the facts of his underlying conviction.
A United States Magistrate Judge may obtain jurisdiction by consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. On February 10, 2012, Petitioner indicated that he consented to have the undersigned Magistrate Judge issue all dispositive rulings in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That subsection provides that the magistrate judge "may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non-jury civil matter and order the entry of judgment. . . ." In such cases, the Magistrate Judge sits as the District Judge, and therefore rules on all matters in the case.
It now appears that Petitioner mistakenly believes that despite his consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, he has recourse by way of a motion for reconsideration before a district judge. However, when a party has consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, as Petitioner did, that party should file a motion for reconsideration with the magistrate judge who issued the order. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to reconsideration by a district judge and his request is denied.
The Court construes Petitioner's motion as a request for reconsideration of the Court's July 13, 2012, order denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the district court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on grounds of:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party:
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that ...