The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kendall J. Newman United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel and in forma pauperis, with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are plaintiff's July 18, 2012 motions to re-open discovery and to compel defendants to provide him with a copy of his deposition transcript. For the following reasons, these motions are denied.
Motion to Re-Open Discovery
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), "[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." See also Zivkovic v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) ("In general, the pretrial scheduling order can only be modified 'upon a showing of good cause.'") (citing Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992)). In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals described Rule 16's "good cause" inquiry:
A court's evaluation of good cause is not coextensive with an inquiry into the propriety of the amendment under ... Rule 15. Unlike Rule 15(a)'s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)' s "good cause" standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension. Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.
Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (citations and quotation marks omitted, modification in original).
Judges of this court have articulated and undertaken the following three-step inquiry in resolving the question of "diligence" in the context of determining good cause under Rule 16:
[T]o demonstrate diligence under Rule 16's "good cause" standard, the movant may be required to show the following: (1) that she was diligent in assisting the Court in creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that her noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, notwithstanding her diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of matters which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference; and (3) that she was diligent in seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that she could not comply with the order.
Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. 1999) (citations omitted).
On January 12, 2012, the court issued a scheduling order setting the discovery cutoff date for May 4, 2012. This order stated that all discovery requests were to be served not later than sixty days prior to this date. This order set the deadline for filing pretrial motions for July 27, 2012.
On June 18, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for a sixty day extension of time to file a dispositive motion based on inadequate law library access. Defendants did not oppose the motion. Accordingly, on July 18, 2012 the undersigned granted plaintiff's motion and extended the dispositive motion deadline to September 27, 2012.
On July 18, 2012, plaintiff filed the pending motion to re-open discovery. Plaintiff alleges that on March 5, 2012, he served defendants with a request for production of documents. Plaintiff alleges that on April 30, 2012, he served defendants with interrogatories. Plaintiff alleges that he did not have adequate time to conduct discovery due to inadequate law library access caused by lockdowns. Plaintiff alleges that on March 7, 2012, and ...