The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable S. James Otero, United States District Judge
Priority Send Enter Closed JS-5/JS-6 Scan Only CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE S. JAMES OTERO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Victor Paul Cruz Courtroom Clerk COUNSEL PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF: Not Present Not Present Court Reporter COUNSEL PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS: Not Present
PROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT
This matter is before the Court on Defendants City of Alhambra, Michael Page, and James Poggensee's (collectively, "Defendants") Notice of Removal ("Notice"), filed on July 30, 2012. (Docket No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court REMANDS this action to Los Angeles County Superior Court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Philip Ramirez ("Plaintiff") filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") in state court on July 26, 2012. (Notice Ex. A ("SAC") ¶ 4, July 30, 2012, ECF No. 1.) Defendants Michael Page and James Poggensee are both employed as police officers by Defendant City of Alhambra. (SAC ¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff's SAC alleges several claims arising out of an incident when Defendants Page and Poggensee entered Plaintiff's home impermissibly and caused Plaintiff injury. (See generally SAC.) In addition to claims of assault, battery, and negligence, Plaintiff's fourth claim alleges that his civil rights, secured by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, were violated when Defendants Page and Poggensee entered Plaintiff's home without his consent or a warrant and used excessive force against Plaintiff. (SAC ¶¶ 45-55.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated California Civil Code section 52.1 by threatening and intimidating Plaintiff as well as entering his home without a warrant using unreasonable force against him. (SAC ¶¶ 46-47.) Plaintiff seeks general, exemplary, and punitive damages against all Defendants. (SAC, Prayer for Relief.)
On July 30, 2012, Defendants removed this case to the Central District of California. (See generally Notice.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges a federal cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Notice ¶ 3.) Defendants assert that this Court therefore has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
A. Sua Sponte Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court raises the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction," the district court must remand the case. Id. at § 1447(c). The Ninth Circuit has noted that "a court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action." Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court finds it appropriate to determine whether jurisdiction exists in this case.
B. Legal Standard for Removal
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, an action is removable to federal court only if it might have been brought there originally. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that courts must "strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction" and reject federal jurisdiction "if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). "The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
C. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have "original jurisdiction" over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal question jurisdiction exists "only [in] those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983) (emphasis added); see also Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689-90 (2006). "When a claim can be supported by alternative and independent theories - one of which is a state law theory and one of which is a federal law theory - federal question jurisdiction does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim. Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 (9th ...