(Super. Ct. No. JV129860)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Butz , J.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Appellant, minor David R., appeals an order of the juvenile court requiring him to pay $1,010 in victim restitution jointly and severally with one co-offender: He contends the court erred in failing to hold a third co-offender equally liable for the victim restitution.
We disagree and shall affirm the restitution order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the probable cause declaration filed by Sacramento police, an officer driving through the Land Park area of Sacramento in November 2010 saw a vehicle parked with its hood up; a records check showed the car had been stolen earlier that day. The officer saw three male minors around the car. David R. was seated in the driver's seat, on a flathead screwdriver, and the ignition had been "punched." The two other minors, K.K. and R.J., appeared to be working on the car engine, which was still warm, and "they were holding pliers, a screwdriver, and a wrench."
All three minors were detained and wardship petitions were filed.*fn1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, David R. admitted he had received a stolen vehicle, a misdemeanor, and was placed on probation. (Pen. Code, § 496d, former subd. (a).) R.J. also admitted receiving a stolen vehicle, while K.K. admitted committing the misdemeanor offense of tampering with a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code section 10852.
The court ordered that all three minors be held jointly and severally liable for payment of the full amount of restitution due the car's owner but, as the victim had not yet submitted a statement of loss, the court retained jurisdiction to determine the amount. After the probation department filed a memorandum in which the victim claimed losses of $1,340 (for towing, door locks, repair to the steering column, and one tire, the court held a contested restitution hearing.
At the hearing, K.K. argued he should be severed from any obligation to pay restitution. He submitted police reports (copies of which are not in the record on appeal), and argued the reports show he was merely seen "walking from the passenger area of the vehicle. The officer never saw [K.K.] in possession, inside the vehicle, or exercising any dominion and control over the vehicle, except that the minor was peering under the hood. The minor also [in the police report] makes a statement to the officer that he did not know the vehicle was stolen. That he was merely rendering aid to the person behind the wheel." In sum, K.K. argued, the victim's vehicle was already incapacitated (it had a flat tire) when he walked up to it, and no damage to the car is attributable to K.K.'s conduct within the meaning of the restitution statute. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6.)*fn2
The prosecutor opposed K.K.'s attempt to be relieved of his joint and several obligation to pay restitution. She argued all three minors had tools at their disposal and asserted control over the car, and K.K.'s conduct--tampering--is reasonably related to the restitution sought. Moreover, she rejected as incredible K.K.'s statement he did not know the car was stolen, because the engine was still warm.
The court reviewed the police reports and stated it would impose that restitution incurred by the victim "as a result of" the minors' conduct, within the meaning of section 730.6, subdivisions (a)(1) and (h). As to K.K., the court reasoned, "The only evidence I have is he walks up [and says], 'Hey, what's up?' He claims he doesn't know the car is stolen, and does not appear to have been the--to have exerted the same kind of control over the car as the . . . other two minors." Accordingly, the court "carve[d] out" K.K. from the previous order holding all three equally responsible for paying restitution, and instead ordered that only David R. and R.J. pay restitution. The court ordered those two minors to pay the victim a total of $1,010, including towing expenses, and costs associated with replacing or repairing the door locks, and steering mechanism.
After the award, counsel for David R. challenged the court's analysis of K.K.'s culpability, and argued the probable cause declaration supported holding K.K. jointly and severally liable for the victim's losses.*fn3 The trial court did not change its order, but suggested David ...