The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, JR United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING ) EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER ) SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER THEREON
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, Luis Castro, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 2, 2012. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until September 6, 2012, and to exclude time between August 2, 2012, and September 6, 2012 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a. The parties represent that a plea agreement is outstanding and under discussion. b. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their respective clients to discuss potential resolutions with their client.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 , et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 2, 2012, to September 6, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Date: 7-31-12 By: /s/ Danny D. Brace, Jr., DANNY D. BRACE, JR., Attorney for Luis Figueroa-Alcazar Date: 7-31-12 By:/s/ Paul Hemesath Authorized to sign for Mr. Hemesath On July 31, 2012 PAUL HEMESATH Assistant U.S. Attorney
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
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