The opinion of the court was delivered by: Otis D. Wright, II United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. moves for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff Daryoush Javaheri's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). (ECF No. 58.) The Court has carefully considered the arguments in support of and in opposition to the JPMorgan's Motion. For the following reasons, JPMorgan's Motion is GRANTED.
On November 14, 2007, Javaheri obtained a $2,660,000.00 mortgage loan from Washington Mutual Bank, FA to finance his property located at 10809 Wellworth Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90024 (the "Wellworth Property"). (Eric Waller Decl. Ex. 4.) In connection with the loan, Javaheri executed a promissory note (the "Note") and a Deed of Trust encumbering the property. (Waller Decl. Exs. 4, 6.) The Deed of Trust identifies Washington Mutual as the lender and Chicago Title Company as the Trustee. (Waller Decl. Ex. 6.)
Javaheri asserts that in November 2007, Washington Mutual transferred the Note to Washington Mutual Mortgage and Securities Corporation. (SAC ¶ 14.) There is no evidence of this. Javaheri also alleges that the Note evidencing his indebtedness was then sold as an investment security to unknown private investors. (SAC ¶¶ 14, 28.) Javaheri identifies this security as Standard and Poor CUSIP number 31379XQC2, Pool Number 432551. (Douglas Gillies Decl. Ex. 5.) Javaheri took this Pool Number from the Deed of Trust and entered it into a "Pool Talk" form on the Fannie Mae website. (Michael B. Tannatt Decl. Ex. 1, Interrogatory No. 5.) But the number on the Deed of Trust was handwritten and read "4325-5-14." (Waller Decl. Ex. 6.) JPMorgan maintains that the number on the Deed of Trust corresponds to the Assessor's Parcel Number. (Mot. 11.) The Assessor's Parcel Number is "4325-005-014." (Jessica Snedden Decl. Exs. 1, 4, 6.)
On September 25, 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision closed Washington Mutual and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. (Waller Decl. Ex. 1.) JPMorgan acquired certain of Washington Mutual's assets by entering into a Purchase and Assumption ("P&A") Agreement with the FDIC. (Waller Decl. Ex. 2.) Paragraph 3.1 of the P&A Agreement states, "Notwithstanding Section 4.8, the assuming Bank specifically purchases all mortgage servicing rights and obligations of the Failed Bank." (Waller Decl. Ex. 2.)
In March 2010, JPMorgan sent Javaheri a Notice of Collection Activity letter stating that he was in default of his mortgage because he had not made any payments since November 2009. (SAC Ex. 5.) Javaheri's attorney at the time responded to the letter, requesting that all future communication related to the loan be conducted through his office. (SAC Ex. 6.)
On May 3, 2010, California Reconveyance Company ("CRC") was substituted as the Trustee for the loan in place of Chicago Title Company. (Snedden Decl. Ex. 1.)
Also on May 3, 2010, CRC recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell the Wellworth Property in the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office. (Snedden Decl. Ex. 2.)
On May 14, 2010, CRC recorded a Notice of Rescission and a second Notice of Default. (Snedden Decl. Exs. 3, 4.) CRC then mailed a second Notice of Default to Javaheri on or about May 24, 2010, and again on June 8, 2010. (Snedden Decl. Ex. 5.) On August 16, 2010, a Notice of Trustee's Sale was recorded and subsequently served on Javaheri, published in a local newspaper, and posted on the Wellworth Property. (Snedded Decl. Exs. 6--9.)
As a result of these events, on October 29, 2010, Javaheri filed a Complaint in this Court against JPMorgan and CRC. (ECF No. 1.) Both Javaheri's original Complaint and his subsequent First Amended Complaint were dismissed for failure to state claims. (ECF Nos. 20, 28.) On April 12, 2011, Javaheri filed his SAC against JPMorgan. (ECF No. 29.) JPMorrgan filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30), which the Court partially granted, leaving only claims for: (1) violation of California Civil Code section 2923.5; (2) wrongful foreclosure; (3) quasi-contract; (4) quiet title; and (5) declaratory and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 36.)
On December 5, 2011, Javaheri filed a Complaint in another action that was nearly identical to the SAC in this case, except that it concerned Javaheri's condominium on Wilshire Boulevard instead of his house on Wellworth. Javaheri v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., No. CV11-10072-ODW (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2011). Due to the cases' similarities, the Court consolidated the later-filed case regarding Plaintiff's condo (CV11-10072) with this earlier-filed case concerning the Wellworth Property (CV10-8185). (ECF No. 50.)
On June 21, 2012, JPMorgan filed a Motion for partial Summary Judgment as to the remaining claims from Javaheri's SAC. (ECF No. 58.) JPMorgan's Motion pertains solely to the Wellworth Property originally associated with case number CV10-8185; it does not address Javaheri's condo.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, after adequate discovery, the evidence demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A disputed fact is "material" where the resolution of that fact might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Where the moving party's version of events differs from the nonmoving party's version, "courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323--24 (1986). The moving party may satisfy that burden by demonstrating to the court that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323--34; Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. Only genuine disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the non-moving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor).
The evidence presented by the parties on summary judgment must be admissible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "[E]vidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact." Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Likewise, conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill's Publ'g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is sufficient ...