UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
August 15, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ANDREY ANDREYEV,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: John A. Mendez United States District Court Judge
VICTOR S. HALTOM, Esq. SBN - 155157 428 J Street, Suite 350 Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone: (916) 444-8663 Attorney for Defendant ANDREY ANDREYEV
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, Andrey Andreyev and Vitaliy Andreyev, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 21, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 23, 2012, and to exclude time between August 21, 2012 and October 23, 2012 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes voluminous records, including mortgage and bank records involving multiple transactions. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying, and/or will be made available.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review these materials, discuss the materials with their clients, and assess the potential sentencing ramifications of the materials.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 17, 2012 to August 21, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
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