The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. John A. Mendez United States District Court Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 21, 2012. 2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until November 13, 2012 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between August 21, 2012 and November 13, 2012, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 150 pages of investigative reports, audio recordings, and photos. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Additionally, the defendant suffers from numerous medical issues that have required surgery and treatment with pain medication that have hindered efforts by the defendant to meet with his attorney. c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 , et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 21, 2012, to November 13, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Dated: August 16, 2012 U.S. ATTORNEY by: /s/ David D. Fischer for MICHAEL D. ANDERSON Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorney for Plaintiff Dated: August 16, 2012 /s/ David D. Fischer DAVID D. FISCHER Attorney for Defendant WILLIAM LAVY
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