UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
August 27, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
ARTHUR DELVALLE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Honorable Manuel L. Real United States District Judge
cc: PSA - LA cc: USPO
ORDER REGARDING (1) SEVERANCE; (2) CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE; AND (3) FINDINGS OF EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FOR DEFENDANTS AZALEA ABAYARI AND JENNIFER MARTINEZ
[PROPOSED] TRIAL DATE: 09-24-13
The Court has read and considered the Stipulation Regarding (1) Severance; (2) Continuance of Trial Date; and (3) Findings of Excludable Time Periods Pursuant to Speedy Trial Act for defendants AZALEA ABAYARI and JENNIFER MARTINEZ (collectively, "defendants"), which was filed on August 24, 2012. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, provides good cause to sever defendants' trial from the trial of their co-defendants, demonstrates facts that support continuing the trial date in this matter, and provides good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.
The Court further finds that: (i) failure to grant the requested severance would result in prejudice to defendants; and (ii) the ends of justice served by granting the severance and proposed continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendants in a speedy trial.
THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN:
1.The trial for defendants ABAYARI and MARTINEZ is severed from the trial of all other co-defendants and continued to September 24, 2013 at 9:00 A.M.
2. The time period of September 25, 2012 to September 24, 2013, inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(A), (h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (h)(7)(B)(ii).
3. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize further exclusions from the period within which trial must commence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Presented by: /s/ JUSTIN R. RHOADES Assistant United States Attorney
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