The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
FIRST SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (Doc. 1) THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
I. Screening Requirement and Standard
Plaintiff David Knapp, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and California law on September 1, 2011. *fn1
Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee
of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss
a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that
are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. §
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
A. Summary of Allegations
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison (CSATF) in Corcoran when the events at issue in this action occurred. Plaintiff names Inmate Appeals Branch Chief N. Grannis, Chief Medical Officer A. Enenmoh, Dr. K. Lee, Correctional Health Care Services Manager G. Martinez, and four Does as defendants. Plaintiff seeks damages and an injunction mandating that he be provided with timely pain medication. However, Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at CSATF and he is therefore limited to seeking damages. *fn2
Plaintiff alleges that he has rheumatoid arthritis, generalized osteoporosis, and disc herniation at L1-2 and L2-3. Plaintiff alleges that from 2006 to present, he has not been provided with appropriate medical care. *fn3 Plaintiff alleges that at times, his conditions have gone untreated for long periods of time, causing his health to deteriorate. Further, as a result of disruptions to his pain medication, he has suffered from crippling pain.
B. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims *fn4
To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve "the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) "the prison official deprived the prisoner of the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'" and (2) "the prison official 'acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.'" Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. . . ." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested "when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment," or in the manner "in which prison physicians provide medical care." McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds , WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
However, under section 1983, Plaintiff must link the named defendants to the participation in the violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory or administrative personnel under the theory of respondeat superior , Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235, and supervisors or administrators may only be held liable if they "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them," Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). In short, some culpable ...