The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
FIRST SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING RFRA, RLUIPA, FREE EXERCISE, MAIL, DUE PROCESS, AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE, AND DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1) THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
I. Screening Requirement and Standard
Plaintiff Michael Whitfield, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)) on August 18, 2011.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity.*fn1 Id. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff's allegations must link the actions or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff, who is now out of custody, brings this action for damages against Correctional Sergeant G. Tulp and Correctional Officer D. Boyett for violating his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at Avenal State Prison.*fn2 On October 17, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred from Facility 5 to Facility 6 due to the closure of the Facility 5 gymnasium. (Doc. 1, Comp., Ex. A.) Plaintiff's claims against Defendants arise out of their alleged refusal to allow him to send his excess personal and legal property to a friend.*fn3 Instead, Defendants impermissibly confiscated and destroyed Plaintiff's excess property, in contravention of state regulations permitting excess property to be sent to another individual.*fn4
Out of the allegedly wrongful confiscation and destruction of his personal property, Plaintiff attempts to bring a litany of claims for the violation of his constitutional rights. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The Court will permit Plaintiff one opportunity to amend those claims with deficiencies which may be curable through amendment, but it bears noting that the Constitution does not provide redress for every grievance. See Hayden v. Grayson, 134 F.3d 449, 457 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[N]ot every form of misconduct is a constitutional violation. . . ."); Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Put simply, not every social injustice has a judicial remedy."). With respect to general conditions of confinement, the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and institutions which house those convicted of serious crimes cannot be free of discomfort. E.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981) (quotation marks omitted). Further, with respect to the infringement into protected rights, lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, and Plaintiff retains only those rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. E.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800 (1974) (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to retaliate against him.
Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech or to petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff correctly asserts that Defendants may not retaliate against him for exercising his right of access to the courts. However, Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any factual support for a claim that Defendants, in confiscating and destroying his property, were ...