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United States of America v. Luis Figueroa-Alcazar

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


September 7, 2012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
v.
LUIS FIGUEROA-ALCAZAR, DEFENDANT

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, JR United States District Judge

DANNY D. BRACE, JR., #114466 LAW OFFICE OF DANNY D. BRACE, JR. 901 H Street, Suite 500 Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 552-6660 Fax: (916) 447-0592 Attorney for Luis Figueroa Alcazar

AMENDED STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT FINDINGS AND ORDER

Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, Luis Castro, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 6, 2012.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 11, 2012, and to exclude time between September 6, 2012, and October 11, 201 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a. The parties represent that a plea agreement is outstanding and under discussion. b. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their respective clients to discuss potential resolutions with their client. c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 6, 2012, to October 11 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

20120907

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