UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 10, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
SERGIO ALONSO MADRIGAL-FELIX, AND MARIO ALFONSO MADRIGAL-FELIX DEFENDANTS.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney CHRISTOPHER S. HALES Assistant U.S. Attorney 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, California 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2700 Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 10, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 9, 2012 at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between September 10, 2012 and October 9, 2012 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 69 pages, and seven discs containing audio recordings, video recordings, and photographs. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. In addition, the government is awaiting results of the analysis of a seized computer, which results will be produced to the defense and are likely to affect negotiations in this case.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 17, 2012 to October 9, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
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