The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, JR United States District Judge
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney JEAN M. HOBLER Assistant United States Attorney 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2700 Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE MOTION HEARING; FINDINGS AND ORDER
THE PARTIES STIPULATE, through counsel, Jean Hobler, Assistant United States Attorney, and Michael Petrik, Jr., attorney for James Stewart Richards, that the Court should vacate the motion hearing scheduled for September 13, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., and reset it on September 27, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. Counsel for the Government will be having a minor surgical procedure at 10:30 a.m. on the scheduled date. While it is possible for the hearing to be completed as scheduled, counsel for defendant would prefer to avoid the risk of a truncated hearing. Given that counsel for the Government will be out of town the following week (potential hearing date September 20, 2012), the first available hearing date is September 27, 2012. The parties therefore request the hearing be rescheduled for that date.
The parties further stipulate that the Court should exclude the period from the date of this order through September 27, 2012, when it computes the time within which the trial of the above criminal prosecution must commence for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. The parties stipulate that the ends of justice served by granting the request for time to reasonably respond to the pending motion outweighs the best interest of the public and Mr. Richards in a speedy trial, and that this is an appropriate exclusion of time given the currently pending motion by the defense, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (Local Code E). The parties note that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) are automatic regarding pending motions and do not require a finding regarding the ends of justice. Nevertheless, the parties stipulate and agree that the ends of justice would outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in the circumstances of this pending motion.
Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Pursuant to the foregoing stipulation, and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS SO FOUNDAND ORDERED.
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