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United States of America v. Omar Cesar Sotelo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


September 12, 2012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
OMAR CESAR SOTELO, DEFENDANTS

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his/her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 17, 2012 at 1:00 p.m.

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until October 29, 2012 at 1:00 p.m. and to exclude time between September 17, 2012 and October 29, 2012 under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided supplemental discovery to the defendant that counsel needs to review.

b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client and the government as negotiations continue to be active and ongoing. Additional investigation may be needed based on the supplemental discovery provided.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and resolution, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government stipulates to the need for the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 16, 2012 to August 27, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

DATED: September 12, 2012 /s/ Laurel J. Montoya LAUREL J. MONTOYA Assistant United States Attorney DATED: September 12, 2012 /s/ Victor Chavez VICTOR CHAVEZ Attorney for Defendant

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

20120912

© 1992-2012 VersusLaw Inc.



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