IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 20, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
EDWAN DABLAN, KHAMAL DABLAN, AND MANUEL VASQUEZ,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dennis L. Beck United States Magistrate Judge
Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney 2500 Tulare St., Suite 4401 Fresno, CA 93721Telephone: (559) 497-4000 Facsimile: (559) 497-4575
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on Monday, September 24, 2012, at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now moves to continue the hearing date until October 22, 2012, at 1:00 p.m. and to exclude time between September 24, 2012, and October 22, 2012.
Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Anthony Capozzi, counsel for defendants Edwan and Khamal Dablan, is currently in a murder trial and is unavailable to reach a final resolution of this matter with his client.
b. Counsel for defendants believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for effective resolution/preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government and counsel for defendant Vasquez do not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 24, 2012, to October 22, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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