IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 20, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
KENNETH EATON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: John A. Mendez United States District Court Judge
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney JARED C. DOLAN Assistant United States Attorney 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2700 Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 25, 2012 at 9:45 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 23, 2012 at 9:45 a.m. and to exclude time between September 25, 2012 and October 23, 2012 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided each of the defendants a proposed plea agreement.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review the terms of the plea offers, review it with their clients, and conduct additional investigation regarding available options.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Counsel for defendants expect that this will be the final continuance necessary.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 25, 2012 to October 23, 2012 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
John A. Mendez
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