The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (Doc. 22)
On July 7, 2010, Plaintiff Carmen Peres Vasquez ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint seeking to reverse the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision denying Plaintiff's claim for Social Security benefits. (Doc. 1.) On March 20, 2012, the Court issued an order reversing the ALJ's decision, remanding the case, and directing that judgment be issued in favor of Plaintiff. (Docs. 20, 21.) Specifically, the Court determined that the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons to discount the opinion of a treating physician. (Doc. 20,17:9-22:7.) As a result, the Court determined that there was not substantial evidence in the record on which the ALJ could rely to support the non-disability finding.
On June 18, 2012, as the prevailing party, Plaintiff filed an application pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") seeking $9,622.85 in attorney's fees. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiff's EAJA application was opposed by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner" or "Defendant"). (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff filed a reply brief on August 1, 2012. (Doc. 26.) In her reply brief, Plaintiff requested an additional 1.5 hours of time for preparation of the reply brief. (Doc. 26, 5:6, n.2.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's application for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the EAJA in the amount of $9,893.76.
A. Plaintiff Meets the Requirements for an Award of EAJA Fees
The EAJA provides that "a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). "Fees and other expenses" include "reasonable attorney fees." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The prevailing party must apply for attorney's fees within thirty days of the final judgment in the action. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Further, the party applying for an award of EAJA fees must have an individual net worth not greater than $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
A remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) has been found to constitute a final, appealable judgment. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 296-302 (1993). A party who obtains a sentence-four remand in a social security appeal is a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA. Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 302. Here, Plaintiff asserts that she was a prevailing party for purposes of the appeal in this case because she obtained a sentence-four remand (Doc. 22, 2:11-12), and Plaintiff argues that the government was not substantially justified in the underlying agency action or in the Commissioner's subsequent litigation position (Doc. 22, 3:11-4:18). Plaintiff further asserts that her net worth as an individual was not more than $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(D)(2)(B). As it relates to Plaintiff's eligibility for an EAJA award, the parties dispute whether the government's litigation position was substantially justified and whether the number of hours billed by Plaintiff's counsel was reasonable.
1. Legal Standard -- Substantial Justification
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), claimants who successfully challenge an agency decision in a civil action are entitled to reasonable fees and other expenses:
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
To be "substantially justified," the position taken must have a reasonable basis in law and fact. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 556-66 (1988); United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial justification is interpreted as being "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person" and "more than merely undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness." Underwood, 487 U.S. at 565; see also Marolf, 277 F.3d at 1161. The fact that a court reverses and remands a case for further proceedings "does not raise a presumption that [the government's] position was not substantially justified." Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 335 (9th Cir. 1988). In considering whether the government's position is "substantially justified," courts consider not only the position of the United States taken in a civil action, but also the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C § 2412(d)(2)(D). Thus, courts "must focus on two questions: first, whether the government was substantially justified in taking its original action; and, second, whether the government was substantially justified in defending the validity of the action in court." Kali, 854 F.2d at 33. However, "[w]here . . . the ALJ's decision was reversed on the basis of procedural errors, the question is not whether the government's position as to the merits [of the plaintiff's disability claim] was substantially justified . . [but] whether the government's decision to defend on appeal the procedural errors committed by the ALJ was substantially justified." Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).
In considering the issue of substantial justification in Le v. Astrue, the Ninth Circuit held that the government's position that a doctor whom the claimant had visited five times over three years was not a treating doctor, while incorrect, was substantially justified since a non-frivolous argument could be made that the five visits over three years were not enough under the regulatory standard, especially given the ...