IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 25, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ROBERT EDWARD MULREADY, AND DUANE PATRICK PETERSEN,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney TODD A. PICKLES Assistant United States Attorneys 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2700 Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 Attorneys for UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER [18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)]
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 28, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 26, 2012 and to exclude time between September 28, 2012 and October 26, 2012 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form amounting to approximately 150 pages of documents and a large number of photographs. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b. After consultation, the defendants and their counsel desire additional time to consult, to review discovery, and to prepare for trial and to also discuss resolution.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The United States does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 28, 2012 to October 26, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
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