The opinion of the court was delivered by: Charles F. Eick United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on March 12, 2012, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits. The parties filed a consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on April 24, 2012. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on August 21, 2012. Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on September 20, 2012.*fn1 The Court has taken the motions under submission without oral argument. See L.R. 7-15; "Order," filed March 12, 2012.
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
Plaintiff, who reportedly has had past relevant work as a "child monitor," "daycare worker" and "teacher aide II," asserts disability based on a combination of alleged impairments (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 18, 82-85, 88-90, 109, 116-24). The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined that Plaintiff suffers from several severe impairments, including coronary artery disease, diabetes, degenerative disc disease, obesity and depression (A.R. 12). The ALJ found that these impairments restrict Plaintiff to the performance of medium work "that would allow her to sit, as needed" (A.R. 14). The ALJ appears to have adopted the "sit, as needed" restriction from the opinion of Dr. Barry Gordon Gwartz, an examining internist who opined Plaintiff must "sit as needed for fatigue or pain in the feet" (A.R. 15, 242). Without consulting a vocational expert, the ALJ stated that all of Plaintiff's past relevant work "would allow her to sit, as needed . . ." (A.R. 18). Consequently, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 18-19). The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 2-4).
Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
The Administration may deny disability benefits when the claimant can perform the claimant's past relevant work as "actually performed," or as "usually" or "generally" performed. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). Although the claimant has the burden of proving an inability to perform his or her past relevant work, "the ALJ still has a duty to make the requisite factual findings to support his [or her] conclusion." Id. at 844. "To determine whether a claimant has the residual capacity to perform his [or her] past relevant work, the [Administration] must ascertain the demands of the claimant's former work and then compare the demands with his [or her] present capacity." Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1986); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
In finding that an individual has the capacity to perform a past relevant job, the determination or decision must contain among the findings the following specific findings of fact:
1. A finding of fact as to the individual's RFC [residual functional capacity].
2. A finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past job/occupation.
3. A finding of fact that the individual's RFC would permit a return to his or her past job or occupation. ...