The opinion of the court was delivered by: Craig M. Kellison United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the court are plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Docs. 15 & 16) and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19).
Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on December 29, 2005. In the application, plaintiff claims that disability began on June 26, 2005. Plaintiff's claim was initially denied. Following denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on August 5, 2008, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Peter F. Belli. In a November 10, 2008, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled based on the following relevant findings:
1. The claimant has the following severe impairments: low back pain, neck and shoulder pain, headaches, and anxiety;
2. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations;
3. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work; and
4. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, residual functional capacity, and vocational expert testimony, jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
After the Appeals Council declined review on February 14, 2011, this appeal followed.
The court reviews the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether it is:
(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). It is ". . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole, including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, must be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).
In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ's findings regarding her mental impairment fail to resolve conflicts in the medical opinion evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in concluding that plaintiff's impairments do not meet Listing 12.06(b); (3) the ALJ failed to set forth clear and convincing reasons to reject her testimony as not credible; (4) the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding is not supported by substantial evidence; (5) the ALJ erred by relying on vocational expert testimony offered in response to hypothetical questions that did not accurately describe plaintiff; and (6) the Appeals Council erred by failing to review the entire record following receipt of new and material evidence regarding the duration of plaintiff's mental impairments.
A. Evaluation of Medical Opinions
Plaintiff's first and fourth arguments relate to the ALJ's evaluation of the medical opinion evidence relating to her mental and physical impairments.
The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual, than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1990).
In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for "clear and convincing" reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. While a treating professional's opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by an examining professional's opinion which is supported by different independent clinical findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be rejected only for "specific and legitimate" reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician's conclusory, minimally supported opinion); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751.
1. Opinions Regarding Mental Impairments
. . .[T]he ALJ should be found to have erred when he found that plaintiff's anxiety caused her to have only "mild" limitations in functioning under the "B" criteria because the Regulations require that the "special technique" used for evaluating mental impairments that the findings be made in a "consistent manner," and the State agency non-examining physician that the ALJ relied on to make his "B" criteria findings did not determine that she had an anxiety disorder, and except for Dr. Azevedo's determination that she had "mild" restriction of her ability to manage activities of daily living his other "B" criteria determinations are inconsistent with Dr. Azevedo's determinations and are not supported by the evidence of record (citations omitted).
Plaintiff adds that the ALJ failed to resolve inconsistencies between Dr. Azevedo's assessment and that of the state agency doctor.
As to medical opinions relating to plaintiff's mental impairments, the ALJ first addressed a report prepared by agency examining ...