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United States of America v. Sergio Hector Aguilar

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


September 27, 2012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
SERGIO HECTOR AGUILAR, DEFENDANT.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Lawrence J. O'neill United States District Judge

BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney 2500 Tulare St., Suite 4401 Fresno, CA 93721 Telephone: (559) 497-4000 Facsimile: (559) 497-4575 Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on Monday, October 1, 2012, at 8:30 a.m.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the hearing date until February 4, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. and to exclude time between October 1, 2012, and February 4, 2013. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery and discuss final resolution with his client.

b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The government does not object to the continuance.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 1, 2012, to February 4, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

Lawrence J. O'Neill

20120927

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